

# The Myths of Vietnam

## Phyllis Amenda

*Contending versions of the Vietnam War and the antiwar movement began to develop even before the war ended. The hawks' version, then and now, holds that the war was winnable, but the press, micromanaging civilian game theorists in the Pentagon, and antiwar hippies lost it. . . . The doves' version, contrarily, remains that the war was unwise and unwinnable no matter what strategy was employed or how much firepower was used. . . Both of these versions of the war and the antiwar movement as they have come down to us are better termed myths than versions of history because they function less as explanations of reality than as new justifications of old positions and the emotional investments that attended them (Garfinkle, 7).*

Pro-war or Anti-war. In the generation alive during the 1960s and 1970s, few, if any, Americans could avoid taking a position on the United States' role in Southeast Asia. As the above quotation from Adam Garfinkle suggests, positions taken in the 1990s, over twenty years after hostilities ended, serve both as an explanation for the U.S. defeat and justification for the positions taken during the war. The hawks' view justifies those who served in Vietnam and appears to give meaning to the deaths of the 58,000 Americans who died there. Those who protested the war or evaded the draft can tell themselves that their actions were justified because the war was immoral, unwinnable and just plain stupid.

American combat involvement ended in 1973. Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese in 1975. Even though the U.S. military forces pulled out of Vietnam 25 years ago, the United States continues to be haunted by the specter of Vietnam. Even the most cursory review of the 1980s and 1990s reveals shadows of Vietnam. A few brief examples:

- Controversy over the Vietnam Veteran's Memorial in Washington, D. C.
- Frequent references to Afghanistan as the U.S.S.R.'s Vietnam.
- George Bush's promise not to make Kuwait "another Vietnam" in 1991.
- Bill Clinton's attempts to avoid military service and whether those attempts were justified.
- Comparisons between Gulf War Syndrome and Agent Orange-related health problems among veterans.

- Continuing questions about whether N.A.T.O. involvement in the former Yugoslavia could become "another Vietnam."

While the controversy over the war has often been reduced to simplistic pro-war or anti-war arguments as illustrated in the opening quotation, a more nuanced reading of post-war literature shows many more areas of controversy. All of these controversies cross over from hawks to doves and back again. Much of the post-war controversy over Vietnam can be summarized in four "myths".

The first myth is that the micromanaging civilians in Washington lost an otherwise winnable conflict. A second myth deals with the degree to which the radical, countercultural anti-war movement forced President Nixon to end the war. A third is the "Rambo" myth which claims that American prisoners of war were kept in captivity in Southeast Asia after the cessation of American military involvement and may still have been imprisoned into the 1990s. And lastly, we will examine the myth that the US government would never knowingly harm its soldiers.

These four myths have been examined in numerous books published since the end of the war in 1973. Five specific works, each of which primarily addresses one of these four myths, also comment on the other myths as well. The books are *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (1981), *Unholy Wars* (1982), *The Vietnam War: A History* (1984), *The Vietnam War: A History* (1984), and *The Vietnam War: A History* (1984).

Lessons of Vietnam, was first published in 1995. McNamara's memoir of his days as Secretary of Defense and his involvement in Vietnam is a confession of the U.S. government's obtuseness and incompetence in prosecuting the war. Even though McNamara ultimately sides with the doves' argument that we should never have

Was it true that the fall of South Vietnam would trigger the fall of all Southeast Asia? Would that constitute a grave threat to the West's security? What kind of war -- conventional or guerrilla -- might develop? Could we win it with U.S. troops fighting alongside the South Vietnamese? Should we not know the answers to all these questions before deciding whether to commit troops? (McNamara, 39)

Answers to these questions would have provided a clear rationale for entering into the war and guided a coherent military strategy for prosecuting it. Without a clear rationale for involvement the government could not clearly explain the reasons for continuing hostilities. In the end, the only reason the U. S. did not withdraw appeared to be the vain posturing of two presidents, neither of whom wished to be labeled as the first American president to lose a war.

The question of goals and accomplishment leads to the other half of this myth. The first question asks whether the civilians in Washington undermined the military command in Asia. The second question also needs to be discussed, whether the war was in fact winnable. The keystone of the hawks' argument is that the war was winnable. The doves were convinced then and are still convinced that the war was not winnable, in fact they claim that "winnable" could not actually be defined. A corollary to this question is: Winnable by what means, military or diplomacy? By 1968, McNamara had come to the conclusion that a military victory was unlikely. He writes, "[t]he fact is I had come to the conclusion, and had told him [President Johnson] point-blank, that we could not achieve our objective in Vietnam through any reasonable military means, and we therefore should seek a lesser political objective through negotiations" (McNamara, 313).

While Robert McNamara ultimately saw the military effort in Southeast Asia as futile, other analysts of the conflict have different opinions. Adam Garfinkle, a scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, argues that the central problem is that the war's tactics were at odds with the stated political goal of the conflict. Garfinkle states that the U.S. had two goals in Vietnam: "to stop Communism and relatedly, to produce a self-sustaining, democratic South Vietnam" (Garfinkle, 30). The United States subverted its own aims by using search and destroy tactics which only served to drive the peasants into the arms of the Viet Cong and destroyed the nationalist credentials of the South Vietnamese government (Garfinkle, 27, 30; see also McNamara, 112). Garfinkle believes that if the U.S. had chosen tactics that truly supported the goals quoted above and was willing to put the kind of time and investment into South Vietnam that were invested in South Korea, the conflict was definitely winnable (Garfinkle, 26-30).

Garfinkle agrees with McNamara that U.S. goals for the war were unclear. He disagrees with "McNamara's Lament" and holds that the civilians did indeed strangle

the military commanders on the ground. If the military commanders did not understand the goals and objectives of the war, it is because the civilians did not communicate them. The mismanagemen

Garfinkle outlines a number of reasons for this nuisance theory and why the movement remained a fringe movement instead of forming a coalition with working class Americans that could have commanded serious attention from Washington politicians. The myth that the movement ended the war arises from the incontrovertible fact that in the end, the American people did register vocal opposition to the war and urged Nixon to get out. The facts that first there was a radical, countercultural movement and then the citizenry registered opposition is taken to be cause and effect. To counter this cause and effect reasoning Garfinkle argues that "the war would have been even more unpopular than it was, sooner than it was, among a broader and more politically salient segment of the American people had radical protests not occurred" (Garfinkle, 13, emphasis in the original). He concludes that ultimately, the television coverage of the war which allowed Americans to see the futility of the war and the ineptness of the political and military authorities moved President Nixon in spite of the activities of the radical fringe. He even goes so far as to state "in the broadest sense, the war was lost because the American ship of state itself had lost its bearings" (Garfinkle, 267). Given the events of the ensuing two years after the war ended, as Watergate unfolded and brought down a president who had been elected in a landslide, Garfinkle's judgment is sound.

The real impact of the anti-war movement was not in ending the war, but in dividing the American people over the nature of government itself. By repudiating 200 years of workaday democracy (and by extension, alienating the people who believed in their government) in favor of a communal, utopian nirvana, extremists helped elect Richard Nixon to the presidency twice and set the stage for the election of Ronald Reagan (Garfinkle, 18, 214-215).

The counterculture of the 1960s and '70s is still influencing American society and politics as the U. S. closes out the 1990s. Examples include Bill Clinton, the first

The third myth concerns the fate of the MIA/POWs in Vietnam. It asks a legitimate question: At the conclusion of hostilities in 1973, did the U.S. government knowingly abandon U.S. servicemen imprisoned by communist forces anywhere in Southeast Asia? This was not merely a question for the military or civilian authorities, but for a large number of American citizens. Since the end of the war, occasional news reports of supposed POW sightings in Southeast Asia continue to reinvigorate the controversy. Movies such as the Rambo series have created an entire mythology of government cover-ups and perfidy. H. Bruce Franklin examines this myth in his 1992 book *M. I. A. or Mythmaking in America*.

The kernel of truth in this myth is that there were over 2,000 servicemen who never returned from Southeast Asia, dead or alive. As wars go, this number of unaccounted soldiers is relatively low, for example, over 78,000 are unaccounted for from WWII and over 8,000 from the Korean conflict (Franklin, 11). At least half of the Vietnam unaccounted for were known to be dead, but for various reasons their bodies could not be recovered and sent home. Most of the others could be reasonably assumed to be dead as soon as they were classified as missing in action. The military services kept separate records of men classified as MIA and POW. Only cases with documentable evidence of capture were labeled POW. Franklin argues that Richard Nixon changed the definition of "missing in action" and also changed the rules of war to generate domestic support for his war policy. President Nixon conflated these two separate categories to attempt to inflate the numbers of those who might be held by the Communists. By increasing the numbers, it would be easier to arouse public support for efforts to free those men, i.e. generating more support for continued military operations (Franklin 96-99).

After campaigning on a "secret plan to end the war," Nixon used the POWs as hostages to convince the American people to back continued escalation of hostilities. Franklin writes,

The POW/MIA issue served two crucial functions in allowing Richard Nixon to continue the Vietnam War for four years, even though he assumed office almost a year after the nation had shown its desperate desire for peace. It was both a booby trap for the anti-war movement and a wrench to be thrown into the works of the Paris peace talks. (Franklin, 74)

It attempted to derail the anti-war movement by changing the objective of the war. Americans were no longer fighting to save the Vietnamese from Communism; they were fighting to free their sons, brave men captured by Communist forces in Asia.

This change of objective also worked in Paris. Nixon required that the North Vietnamese and all other combatants release prisoners as a condition of peace.







government agencies, especially the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) for using poor science as well as succumbing to political pressure in order to justify denying medical and disability benefits to Agent Orange victims. The report found "evidence of political interference . . . by Administration officials" (Report, 9) and "the perpetration of fraudulent conclusions" (Report, 10)

Admiral Zumwalt recommended that the VA should grant full benefits to any Vietnam veteran or their children who exhibited symptoms of over 20 illnesses linked

in the years following the war demonstrate that the Communists were not magnanimous heroes who forgave their enemies and forgot the costs of war.

The Rambo myth relies on demonizing the Vietnamese and completely exculpates the Americans of any guilt for the damage done to Vietnam. If all Vietnamese are "gooks" and all G.I.s are heroes epitomized by Sylvester Stallone or Chuck Norris, then Vietnam becomes the modern incarnation of the old fashioned western where the Indians are always evil and the Seventh Calvary will always save the day in the last reel. That model was inaccurate and racist in the case of the Old West, and the same problems exist in the case of Vietnam.

The fourth myth is no different. In seeking to insulate itself from responsibility to Agent Orange victims, the American government has not only avoided responsibility for the effects of Agent Orange on the Vietnamese people, but it has also ignored evidence of Agent Orange damage on soldiers from Australia. If anyone doubted that apparent government policy has been to deny or ignore the long-term aftereffects of war on veterans, the Gulf War Syndrome controversy in the 1990s has served to confirm the callousness and ineptitude of the Department of Veteran's Affairs

After examining these myths, the American people need to examine how they work together to shape public opinion. These myths are connected and continue to shape American culture in many ways. The Rambo myth believes that the US government conspired to abandon G.I.s in Southeast Asia. Once that belief has been planted in the collective consciousness, it is only logical to believe that the government might be conspiring to keep other information from the American people. Such events as the assassination of President Kennedy prompt heated debates as to the government's knowledge and actions. The actual and documented lies told by government officials combined with speculations about other lies that may have been told by seemingly all-powerful leaders breeds acceptance of outrageous conspiracy theories such as those promulgated by The X-Files.

Even if one does not go as far as taking The X-Files for gospel, government intransigence in the Agent Orange issue breeds a distrust of authority. The Agent Orange episode is like a bureaucratic squid covering the poor veteran in a cloud of black ink as it swims off to avoid confrontation. One might think that after the Agent Orange mess, the military services and the VA would have learned a lesson, but in the next war, the government was still making the same mistakes as in Vietnam. An article in the May 1999 issue of Vanity Fair argues that Gulf War Syndrome is indeed a real condition, given to the soldiers through experimental vaccines. Just as the use of herbicides in Vietnam was meant to help the soldiers by preventing enemies from using the jungle as camouflage, the use of experimental anthrax vaccines in the Gulf War was meant to protect soldiers from real danger of biological warfare. But just as

in Vietnam, when the measures that were meant to help soldiers backfired, the bureaucrats (both civilian and military) ran for cover and denied everything. In an open society such as the United States, the paper-pushers' mistakes eventually catch up with them and they have to admit they were wrong. But in the meantime, many innocent people have become gravely ill and have even died before these mistakes were exposed. In the end, these situations reinforce perceptions of a callous government which lies routinely to its citizens.

The answer to the Agent Orange and Gulf War controversies lies in the very mechanism that allows the myths to grow, an open society. Careful scholarship published in academic and popular media are the only way to distinguish the kernel of truth in the cloud of popular mythmaking. In both the university and the marketplace of ideas, scholars should study Vietnam and all that relates to U.S. involvement there and bring that information to their students and to the society. Each of the four books discussed have made a valuable contribution to this goal. They have been widely available, in fact, McNamara's book was a best seller. Franklin published an articles  
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# **The Ethnic Component of Germany's Ostforschung: The Interwar Years and Beyond By**

**Ute Ferrier**

Over the last century issues of ethnicity, citizenship and statehood have often been at the center of discussions concerning Germany's tumultuous history. Unlike the United States, Germany bases its citizenship predominantly on the legal principal of *jus sanguinis* meaning by right of birth or ancestry. Thus people who have German parents are automatically granted citizenship no matter where they were born or how long ago their ancestors left Germany, while immigrants who have resided in Germany for several generations are still denied this right. Refugees from the former Soviet Union who can prove German ancestry can gain citizenship immediately, even if their ancestors emigrated three hundred years ago. Often these immigrants, especially from the Asian republics, have only retained rudimentary knowledge of the German language and are ill-prepared to adjust to the highly modernized German society. By contrast, Turkish immigrants who have been working and paying taxes in Germany since the 1950s, cannot gain citizenship. Their children and grandchildren were born in Germany, they were educated in German schools and are often culturally more adjusted to German society than they are to Turkish society. There are few exceptions to this rule but the process and financial cost of becoming a citizen has been prohibitive for most.

. The concept of the ethnic nation (*Volk*) has its administrative roots in the nineteenth century when German states and municipalities sought to restrict poor relief to their local residents, thus excluding destitute transients from receiving aid. By the time the law on citizenship was passed in 1913 the question of "who was a German" had been heavily influenced by ideology. This law, which still forms the basis for citizenship in Germany today, not only determined that *jus sanguinis* be the national criteria for citizenship, it also extended this right to all ethnic Germans living abroad and made this right inheritable.

By comparison, the United States and France base their citizenship primarily on the principle *jus soli*, meaning that those who are born on the national territory (or its colonies) can obtain citizenship. In the United States this principle is taken to its extreme as it grants citizenship even to those who are born within its airspace; for example a person born on an airplane flying overhead can become a U.S. citizen on

those grounds. Most European states use a combination of jus sanguinis and jus soli; and in recent years the traditionally liberal state of France has made efforts to restrict immigration. However, it still grants citizenship to far more applicants than Germany does.

Some scholars have argued that Germany needs to review its immigration principles, especially given the fact that Germany has had a negative population growth for several decades now. Henry Ashby Turner, jr. has stated that Germany's immigration politics and popular opinion regarding this issue is based on two myths: the myth that immigration was historically foreign to Germany and the myth of the ethnic nation. Turner calls for the historical profession to enlighten the public and dissolve the myths. He even suggests that the terminology in the basic law (Grundgesetz) be changed from the "German Volk" to the "citizens of the federal republic."

In the past, this view that the nation consists of an ethnically and biologically closed society has had dramatic consequences, because the argument was partly used to justify discrimination against Jewish citizens and foreigners. Even today /P <</MCIn tveic."

was difficult for the German elites to find a tenable cultural orientation for the new state. Otto Hinze wrote at this time that the Western alternative was that "of the



After the devastating defeat of World War I and the humiliating terms of peace, Germany intellectuals responded to the crisis in several ways. They tried to make sense of what had happened and questioned what had gone wrong both internally and externally that could have made such a collapse possible. For many it was a time of soul searching. Some ideas that had been vague before the war were now clearly formulated. In 1935, Karl Alexander von Müller gave the keynote address at the tenth annual conference of the German academy in Munich. In his speech titled "Problems of the Second Reich in light of the Third" he noted that Germans became politically and historically aware before the war but that scholars only faintly apprehended what the purpose of the state and the future of the nation could be. World War I changed all that because the defeat was absolute: the entire state collapsed. From that time on questions regarding the nation or the state could no longer remain ambiguous. They were pressing and needed clear answers.

During the 1920s the national or *völkisch* movement gained momentum, because it presented a seemingly reasonable answer. The concept that Germans are one people no matter where they live became more widespread and was central to many new institutions. Immediately following the war numerous organizations were founded which sought to encourage *völkisch* movements at home and abroad. One such organization was the German association for the protection of Germandom in the border regions and abroad (*Deutscher Schutzbund für das Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtum*). Representatives of the association raised public awareness regarding Germans abroad. They no longer saw these Germans as foreigners but as fellow citizens who, because of their sacrifices, were entitled to special privileges from the German state. Implicit in this line of reasoning was the hope that maybe the borders of Germany could be expanded eastward, which would make up for some of the land lost with the Versailles Treaty. In the volatile political climate of the Weimar Republic, Germans tried to evaluate their standing in Europe, deal with the humiliation of Versailles, and regain some of Germany's former power. Scholars such as Walter Kuhn and Hermann Aubin argued that the Reich should take a stronger stance regarding its eastern borders.

This does not mean that there was consensus among academics on what course of action needed to be taken. Attitudes were rather diffuse. However, many who were attracted to the *völkisch* movement tended to have one belief in common: a deep skepticism of modernity which could flare into open animosity. For these scholars the Germans living in eastern and southeastern Europe represented an older agrarian tradition which they considered to be closer to what Germany ought to be. Germans in eastern Europe were largely unaffected by industrialization and urbanization, thus scholars bestowed upon them a "higher ethnic dignity" because they lived a lifestyle that was equated to the Paradise lost.

Scholars interested in German minorities studied their subject from a cultural and territorial point of view, combining the concept of cultural territory (Kulturboden) with that of national territory (Volksboden). German superiority lay at the foundation of these inquiries. Seemingly wherever Germans went they had well functioning established settlements from the jungles of Brazil to the tundras of the far North. Consequently if Germans did well in diverse environments, their successes could not be attributed to geographical location but to hard work, skill and determination.

From the early 1920s on ethnic Germans became increasingly important to scholars. After Versailles there had to be a distinction between the "cultural nation" (Kulturnation) and the "state-nation" (Staatsnation) and the traditional methodologies were inadequate. Now that the Staatsnation had been destroyed, territorially confined, financially penalized and morally held responsible for World War I, there was little solace to be found there. However, the Kulturnation offered exciting possibilities among them studying the German nation and its cultural heritage without having to deal with the state's recent history. Studying Germans abroad meant, however, that

Michael Burleigh agrees that there was little academic resistance to the Nazis but he articulates this failure in stronger terms. For him the "politicization and instrumentalization of a scholarly discipline under the Nazi regime" is clearly a deficit of "intellectual endeavor."

The experts did not challenge existing stereotypes and misconceptions; they worked within their boundaries and reified them through empirical 'evidence.' Dissident voices were silenced by authoritarian scholar-managers who policed the politics of their subordinates without government prompting. Anti-democratic professional structures served at once to perpetuate misconceptions and to facilitate government control. The politicians and bureaucrats had the measure of academic power-brokers.

According to Burleigh, academics who were involved in Ostforschung were not a lunatic fringe but part of the educated élite

paradigm shift was rather a return to an older paradigm; this time a return to political, diplomatic and intellectual history. "This paradox helps to explain why, in the short run at least, the defeat of Germany in 1945 did more to restore the hallowed traditions of German historicism than it did to revise them." Besides this methodological shift, the German historical profession remained nonetheless conservative and some have argued that after the war there was more of a continuation than a discontinuation. For example, in what became the Federal Republic (West Germany), most historians who held positions under the Nazis kept their jobs after 1945. Even those twenty-four professors who were suspended because they had been incriminated were by and large readmitted into the discipline in the 1950s. On the other hand, the vast majority of

replaced by the concept of the "mature industrial society." This shift also made the transformation from a Germanocentric view to a philo-European one easier.

Theodor Schieder, who is considered to be one of the towering intellects of the time, had practiced *Volkskunde* in the interwar years. After 1945 he adopted a structural approach to history but remained fundamentally interested in political history. After World War II, Schieder trained hundreds of students, among them Hans-Ulrich Wehler. Schieder's approach eventually led the way to "social history of politics" which later became associated with the Bielefeld school. This historiographical overview demonstrates a clear connection between politics, ideology and historical paradigms. The political conditions after World War I, led many historians to move away from historicism to embrace *Volksgeschichte*. After World War II, *Volksgeschichte* had to be adjusted and during the 1950s historicism again predominated. However, in the 1960s and 1970s many scholars of the historicist school retired and the discipline moved in the direction of historical social science. Methodologically this new paradigm was built on the foundations of *Volksgeschichte*, even though it was no longer anti-modern and prescribed to a European rather than a German vision. The paper will now examine how the historical discipline impacted the way in which the history of the Germans in southeastern Europe was written.

## **Regional Context**

In southeastern Europe problems surrounding ethnicity and nationalism have been evident since the concept of the nation-state had become influential in the early nineteenth century. In this historically multi-ethnic region ethnic relationships were particularly strained during both world wars, when different ethnic groups which had co-existed under one administration now fought on opposite sides. Yugoslavia, which became a state after World War I, was the most complicated of the interwar states because it contained the largest and most varied number of pre-1918 units.

From the Austrian half of the late Habsburg Empire, Yugoslavia inherited Slovenia 8(o)8(ve)14(ni)

particularly instructive to examine the role Nazi ideology played in the events leading up to expulsion.

The Danube Swabians represent one of several groups who were resettled in Europe during the twentieth century. It has been estimated that during and after World War II

minorities viewed themselves in their predominantly multi-ethnic environment. This discrepancy seems to be the case regarding ethnic identity: while ethnologists and historians stressed how rooted in the German culture these minorities were, many Germans in southeastern Europe actually took pride in the fact that they were able to coexist as an integral part with other cultures.

In the interwar years ethnologists predominantly categorized German groups in southeastern Europe according to national-linguistic criteria. Their studies focused on continuity and on how the German language and culture was retained. From this point of view Germans lived as minorities in German-speaking enclaves in the midst of a foreign environment henceforth the study came to be known as Sprachinselforschung, which means the study of linguistic islands.

Walter Kuhn, pioneer in the field, published his book *Deutsche Sprachinselforschung* in 1934 and became professor of *Volkskunde* (ethnology) in Breslau two years later.



experiences and economic interests. The fact that some of them were German

region experienced an economic crisis in the early 1930s. Thus the quality of life deteriorated for many Danube Swabians.

After the German Reich and the Yugoslav government had improved their relations in the mid 1930s, political conditions improved for the German minority in Yugoslavia. In 1931 a compromise had been reached regarding German schooling. However, it was too late to quiet the discontent among the younger generation. Disillusioned by their economic and political condition and the setbacks they had suffered during the previous decade, the younger Swabians were increasingly susceptible to Pan-German rhetoric. By the mid 1930s the Volksgruppe experienced an internal crisis. The younger generation, which came to be known as the Erneuerer (renewers), wanted allegiance to the Reich. The older generations had been raised under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and saw a political al

there was an increased presence of representatives from Germany in the Vojvodina. Often these officials were invited to festivities such as the anniversary of the founding of a particular village. In the 1930s, many communities that had been established during the 1780s, celebrated their 150th anniversary and invited Germans from the Reich to join in the celebration. German functionaries thus did become more visible in

was of no consequence what the political background of the individuals were, if they were ultra-Nazis or apolitical persons. With one stroke he rid the state of a potentially formidable bourgeois class, repatriated the most fertile land and the most valuable properties. Because many Swabians had been compromised during the occupation, he had popular support.

Since most of the German men had already been drafted, the majority of Swabians who bore the brunt of these measures were women, children and the elderly. Those who could not leave on time were interned in concentration camps. "In Rudolfgrad along, of the 33,000 Swabian internees almost 10,000, including women and children, that is nearly one-third, died between October 1945 and March 1948." Thousands of interns were shipped to the Soviet Union for forced labor. Until the concentration camps in Yugoslavia were dissolved, nearly 70,000 Swabians died. Another 28,000 died as a result of the war, which brings the total for Swabians in Yugoslavia to 98,000 roughly 20 percent of the population. These losses left deep scars on the psyches of the survivors.

The Danube Swabians were, of course, not the only victims of the war; they were but



of the scholarship but it is noteworthy that his work was not edited before publication.  
In his later works

some of these major trends are evident, older currents and undercurrents remained and existed simultaneously. Scholars simply could not wipe the slate entirely clean. They continued to fall back on older methodologies, even though they altered them and made them more suitable for the times. Thus in the postwar historiography conservative elements were retained while some innovative elements were incorporated. The desire to once again be a part of the European community, necessitated a change of focus and this turn away from a national agenda was also reflected in the expellee literature.

In recent years efforts have been made to overcome national identities and prepare Europeans for a truly European Community. This has proven difficult; indeed there seems to be evidence that many Europeans cling all the more tenaciously to regional identities. Even as some have declared that the era of the nation-state is over, it is not clear that internationalism can take its place. Ethnicity as a means of group identification is likely to remain important at least in the immediate future. This of course lends itself to be used by those who seek to consolidate political or territorial power. Even today ethnic identity is being mobilized for nationalistic purposes in Europe. The recent civil war in Yugoslavia stands as a stark reminder that this chapter is not yet concluded. It also shows that history is still being manipulated to serve political or territorial ambitions. As such historians are not merely passive observers who record the history of their people. Instead they actively participate in the making of that history, and they do so in more ways than one.

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perpetuated the powerful system of privilege. In 1706, the king charged the Paris police with maintaining control and order in these playhouses.

The Crown supported the three royal theatres financially and governed their management until the end of the ancien régime. The First Gentlemen of the Bedchamber directed the administration of the Comédie-Française by hiring and dismissing personnel, and by composing rules regulating everything from requiring actors to accept their assigned roles to demanding that players be punctual for rehearsals. The actors were considered servants of the king, with the expectation that they would entertain at court and accept the disciplinary actions of royal authority. With the Crown providing royal patronage, the actors served the king first, and only secondarily answered to the public. Although the theatre troupe counted on ticket sales to underwrite the largest share of its productions, the Crown's monetary patronage provided a continuous subsidy to compensate the actors and a justification for extensive royal control over administration. In spite of the cultural function of the theatre and its support from the state, the Roman Catholic Church denied actors the benefit of religious rites, and the occupation carried the penalty of excommunication. Voltaire highlighted the hypocrisy of the religious and social stigma placed on actors whose vocation was patronized by the nobility and sanctioned by the law.

The reality of a state theatre demanded that the productions would promote the monarchy and the Roman Catholic Church. Playwrights were personally obligated to

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stage settings. Playwrights operated in a society that revolved around the French court, and its tastes in drama shaped the themes and presentations. Correspondingly, most dramatists catered to royal and aristocratic preferences in order to obtain influential positions at court and in the Académie Française. These authors typically produced classical tragedies and comedies of manners featuring characters of noble birth. During the years before the Revolution, audiences were increasingly drawn from diverse status levels, as a greater number of plebian members of society, who had been exposed to drama at the boulevard theatres, purchased tickets for the privileged playhouses. Students, professionals, army officers, and others who lacked the means or inclination to purchase a seat filled the space in the pit. Reflecting the heterogeneous composition of these audiences, some plays that were originally applauded by the court at Versailles failed to receive plaudits from the audiences of the capital's public theatres. Parisians did not blindly accept aristocratic tastes, but expressed their own satisfaction with or disapproval of the plays they watched. As the century progressed, a system of market values emerged to compete with the tradition of aristocratic sponsorship. For many men of letters, dramatic popularity in public performance was becoming more important to a playwright's reputation and income than patronage. Dramatists later in the century, such as Denis Diderot, Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, and Louis-Sébastien Mercier, wrote moralistic comedies and tragedies in an attempt to influence more diverse metropolitan audiences.

While the Crown was mainly concerned with the policing and censorship of the theatre, bourgeois dramatists made a more direct attempt to influence the thinking and behavior of their audiences. Diderot viewed drama not only as entertainment but also as a method of promoting Enlightenment beliefs based on the idea of human perfectibility. Mercier argued that the theatre should endeavor to appeal to the masses, not just to the upper classes of society. A social reformer with many egalitarian ideas, Mercier reasoned that drama should have less emphasis on refined tastes and be more accessible to common contemporary interests.

Advocates of the bourgeois drama viewed the theatre as an ideal didactic medium for

church as a teacher of virtue. The shared theatrical experience performed a service of uniting people in a sense of common humanity. In the playwrights' vision, bourgeois theatre could function as an ideological instrument of cultural change, creating new ways of thinking and communicating in a perfected social order by shaping virtue on a personal level. Through identification with the characters on stage, the audience would





In contrast to the quest for limitation and control, other intellectuals argued that installing seats would threaten the bastion of republicanism that the parterre's denizens incarnate

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